The study contributes to our understanding of the forces that drive the stock market by investigating how different types of investors react to new financial statement information. Using the extremely comprehensive official register of share holdings in Finland, we find that the majority of investors are more probable to sell (buy) stocks in a company after a positive (negative) earnings surprise, and show a bias towards buying after the disclosure of new financial statement information. Large investors, on the other hand, show behavior opposite to that of the majority of investors in the market. Further, foreign investors show behavior similar to that of domestic investors. We suggest investor overconfidence and asymmetric information as possible explanations for the documented behavior.
Introduction
It seems safe to say that most academics and practitioners within financial economics agree that new earnings information has strong implications for the market value of a company 1 . Especially, the dazzling resources continuously invested by market participants in financial statement analysis bear evidence to the importance of earnings in valuation. Given this, we know surprisingly little about how different investors do in fact interpret and react to new earning figures. A straightforward assumption to make would be that all types of investors, on average, react homogeneously to new earnings information. This view obeys the classical market efficiency literature in which all investors are fully rational individuals that process new information objectively. However, recent research by for instance Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) , Odean (1998b) , and Hong and Stein (1999) indicates that investors may not be fully rational in the strict traditional sense. More specifically, investment decisions may be affected by psychological biases, such as overconfidence.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that directly investigates how different types of investors react to new financial statement information.
Empirical evidence at odds with fully homogeneous investors is gathered by Lee (1992) , who investigates whether differences can be detected between small versus large trades after the disclosure of earnings news. He finds that positive (negative) surprises increase the fraction of large buy (sell) transactions, and that small transactions on average increase irrespectively of the news. However, since the 1 A number of theoretical and empirical studies document a strong relationship between earnings and company value. See for instance Ohlson (1995) for a theoretical discussion and Lev (1989) for a survey of some empirical findings.
investors behind the trades remain anonymous, he cannot distinguish between the different types of investors behind the transactions. Booth, Kallunki and Martikainen (1999) find that small "sell" trades increase after negative earnings surprises, but as in the case of Lee (1992) they cannot distinguish the different types of investors behind this behavior due to the limitations of the employed data set. Using a subset of the transaction database employed in this study, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) investigate how different types of investors' buy and sell behavior can be explained by past returns.
They document differences in the behavior of different investor groups, showing that foreign investors tend to be momentum investors whereas Finnish investors primarily rely on contrarian investment strategies. In a study contemporaneous to this study, Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho (2001) use quarterly data to investigate the trading between large and small US investors as a function of changes in accounting return on equity (ROE) of the traded companies. They find that large investors buy (sell) shares from (to) smaller investors as a response to increases (decreases) in accounting return on equity. However, they cannot distinguish between the different types of investors beyond "large" and "small" investors.
Equipped with an extremely comprehensive transaction data set from Finland, containing detailed information on a daily basis including virtually all transactions in stocks in Finland during the period December 28 1994 to May 30 2000, we set out to get a glimpse into the minds of different types of investors with respect to how they interpret and react to new earnings information. We hence seek to document whether indications of behavioral patterns can be documented for different types of investors, or whether all investors on average react homogeneously. This study contributes to earlier and contemporaneous literature in at least the following. 2 These estimates are on average approximately two weeks, but at most one month, old.
3 Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho (2001) use changes in accounting return on equity (ROE) as a proxy for cash-flow news. This approach implicitly states that last period's ROE is the best estimate for this period's ROE, which is an assumption somewhat at odds with the existence of a financial analyst industry.
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 discusses the implemented methodology. Results are displayed in Section 4 and further analyzed in section 5. Finally, section 6 summarizes the paper.
The data
The total data set used in the study consists of four subsets: 1) the Finnish Central Securities Depository central register data set, 2) realized fiscal year earnings figures, 3)
analyst consensus fiscal year earnings forecasts, and 4) annual report disclosure dates for the investigated companies.
The Finnish Central Securities Depository Central Register data set
The employed transaction data set is, to the best of our knowledge, one of the 
Methodology
The question of whether behavioral differences between different groups of investors exist can be tackled by estimating a model with an investor reaction proxy as dependent variable and an earnings surprise proxy as independent variable for each group of investors.
Investor reaction
Investors' reactions to the disclosure of new financial statement information for a certain company C is gauged by first identifying all investors who have traded in the company stock during the week after the disclosure, including the day of disclosure, An investor reaction proxy I, C R t, t+6 can then be calculated for investor I, company C and disclosure date t according to the following:
where I, C R t, t+6 is the reaction proxy for investor I and company C for the time period t to t+6, I, C NH t+6 is the net holding in company C for investor I at time t+6, and I, C NH t-1 is the net holding in company C for investor I at time t-1
The above defined measure I, C R t, t+6 hence expresses the following. If investor I has increased his/her net holding in stock C during the time period t to t+6, the measure expresses the fraction of the final position at time t+6 that has been acquired during the event window. On the other hand, if investor I has decreased his/her net holding in stock C during the time period t to t+6, the measure expresses the fraction of the initial position at time t-1 that has been sold out during the event window. Finally, if investor I has traded in stock C during the time period t to t+6, but not changed his/her net holding, the measure takes the value 0. Clearly, the above defined investor reaction proxy will be a continuous function taking values [-1, 1] . Further, the investor reaction proxy is symmetric, which is important in order to not introduce a bias in the variable.
An obvious alternative when measuring investor reaction is to calculate the simple change in I, C NH during the time period t to t+6. The above defined approach is however preferred for one fundamental and two econometric reasons. First, we believe that the investor reaction proxy defined in equations (1), (2) and (3) Another alternative when measuring investor reaction is to employ a discrete framework, by for instance assigning the reaction proxy variable the value 0 for decreases in holdings and 1 for increases in holdings. However, by moving into a discrete framework we would lose the magnitude of the reaction, as the only the direction of the investor reactions would remain. The above proposed and in this study employed way of measuring investor reaction enables us to measure both the direction and the magnitude of the investor reactions, however avoiding the pitfalls of the simple changes methodology.
Earnings surprises
Positive versus negative earnings surprises are identified by calculating the difference between the latest analysts' consensus earnings estimate and the corresponding realized figure. As was pointed out earlier, analysts' estimates are updated monthly, which ensures high validity for the estimates. The deviation between analysts' consensus estimates and actual outcomes are calculated as
where C ES t is the earnings surprise for company C at time t, C EA t are earnings for company C at time t, and E[ C EA t ] is the latest analysts' consensus earnings estimates for company C at time t. The absolute value for E[ C EA t ] is used in equation (4) Descriptive statistics in Table 1 reveal that the estimates on average have been quite unbiased with a mean of -3.4% and a median of 0.0%. The mean earnings surprise is insignificant, deviating -3.4% / 2.6% = -1.29 standard deviations from zero, as should be expected for skilled analysts.
[Please insert Table 1 here]
Regression models
Models with the investor reaction proxy as dependent variable and the earnings surprise proxy variable as independent variable are OLS estimated for each group of investors separately along the specification I, C R t, t+6 = a + b C ES t + e (5) 6 If we for instance have a negative analysts' consensus earnings estimate and a positive realized figure, not using the absolute value for the analysts' consensus earnings estimate yields a negative surprise proxy even though the realized earnings figure exceeds the analysts' consensus earnings estimate.
where I, C R t, t+6 is the reaction proxy for investor I and company C during time period t to t+6, a is the estimated constant, b is the parameter estimate for C ES t , C ES t is the earnings surprise proxy for company C at time t, and e is the error term. All models are routinely estimated using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix to minimize the effects of possible heteroscedasticity.
Results
The total data set, created according to the specifications given above, consists of 53,631 observations. Descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 reveal that transactions executed by households constitute the largest single group with 44,050 observations. [Please insert Table 2 here]
Regression results for the different investor main categories in Table 3 reveal several interesting findings with respect to how different types of investors behave under new financial statement information.
[Please insert Table 3 here]
As can be observed in Table 3, companies Nonprofit organizations is the only investor category that does not show any systematic behavior after the disclosure of new financial statement information, which is indicated by the insignificant constant and parameter estimate.
The results for households are extremely interesting; households seem to be more likely to decrease (increase) their holdings after a positive (negative) earnings surprise. This is revealed by the very significantly negative parameter estimate for the earnings surprise proxy (-0.22 ). In addition, households appear to be keen to increase their holdings after the disclosure of new financial statement information as indicated by the very significantly positive constant (0.14). In summary, we find that investors in all but one of the six investigated categories have a bias for increasing their holdings during the week after the disclosure of new financial statement information. Further, we find that households and countries and international organizations are more likely to decrease (increase) their holdings after positive (negative) earnings surprises. Since we know that markets have to clear we also know that there must exist one or several groups that systematically show opposite behavior. These groups are more eager to sell than to buy during the week after the disclosure of new financial information and show a positive correlation between earnings surprises and changes in stock holdings. Since the behavioral patterns documented above are quite homogeneous for all the different investigated investor categories, it seems that this group of opposite behavior must include rather large investors to fulfill the market clearing condition.
A further analysis of large investors
As a consequence of the above-presented results, a new investor category, large investors, is created by gathering 10% of the observations with the largest net holding, in number of shares, at time t-1 for each company separately. The identification of large investors is done for each company separately in order to avoid having the data set excessively dominated by transactions in large companies, such as Nokia, which certainly attract much of the activity from large investors. Investor size is hence defined as a relative measure among investors that trade in the same company.
The distribution of events for the new investor category over the earlier investigated investor categories is displayed in Table 4 . When comparing Table 4 with the corresponding statistics for the total sample in Table 2 , it is apparent that all investor categories except for households represent significantly larger fractions of the total transactions in the large investors group than in the total sample. Households are significantly less represented in the large investors category, as might well be expected.
Worth noting is also that the fraction of financial institutions is more than 5 times greater in the large investors sample than in the total sample (25.62% versus 4.79%).
[Please insert Table 4 here]
Regression results for the large investors category, displayed in Table 5 [Please insert Table 5 here]
The positive correlation between earnings surprises and investor reaction gains support from Lee (1992) 
A further analysis of foreign investors
The analysis above indicates that foreign investors do not dominate the large investor category. However, it remains extremely interesting to investigate the behavior of foreign investors, irrespective of their size, as a separate investor category. A new investor category denoted foreign investors is created by extracting all transactions executed by foreigners from the total data set, through an investor-specific procedure.
The distribution of events over the six major investor categories for the foreign investor category, displayed in Table 6 , reveals that the majority of the transactions executed by foreigners belong to the financial institutions investor category. This is quite an expected observation as foreigners acting under nominee registration appear in this investor category.
[Please insert Table 6 here]
Regression results for the foreign investors category, displayed in Table [Please insert Table 7 here]
Altogether, we find that foreign investors show behavior highly similar to that of the majority of investors in the market. This is an extremely important finding as it supports the conclusion that large investors, irrespective of origin, act as antagonists to the rest of the market with respect to new financial statement information.
Conclusions
Our results deviate from the traditional view of homogenous investor behavior, as we find that systematic differences in behavior can be documented for different types of investors under new financial statement information. Even though the investigated data set is of impressive size, hence reducing the risk of spurious results due to a biased sample, some plausible explanation always enhance the validity of empirical findings.
In the following, we try to present some rationale for the central observations in this study.
Investor overconfidence?
We find that positive (negative) earnings surprises increase the probability of households and countries and international organizations decreasing (increasing) their holdings. Large investors, on the other hand, show opposite behavior with respect to earnings surprises, and hence act as counterparts to households and countries and international organizations with respect to earnings surprises. These findings imply that some categories of investors systematically estimate the impact of new earnings information differently than other categories. It seems clear that these differences cannot be a consequence of investors' estimation accuracy, since we then should witness differences in the variance of the estimation errors, not in the means. The big question is hence without doubt why we witness systematic differences in investor estimation error, and the resulting systematic differences in behavior, between different categories of investors.
Overconfidence, meaning that individuals overweight the importance of their private information versus new public information, is a well-established psychological phenomenon 7 . Overconfidence has been documented for individuals in an array of different professions such as nurses, engineers, attorneys and market professionals, as discussed by Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) . Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Odean (1998b) 
In equilibrium, the value perceived as correct by the two types of investors of a company at time t-1, when no new information is available on the market, equals the market value.
At time t new public information PUB I t arrives to the market, which would to the fully rational investor indicate a shift PUB ∆V t in the value of the company. However, since the two types of investors S and U are overconfident, they will give the new public information less weight than the fully rational investor. 
Hence, when public information interpreted as positive (negative) by the fully rational investor is received by the market, the value perceived as correct by the less overconfident investors S will be higher (lower) than the value perceived as correct by the more overconfident investors U. If the new public information is interpreted as neutral by the fully rational investor, all investor types will agree on the value of the company. It is important to note that the conclusions also hold when investors of type S are fully rational investors ( S w = 1). The implications for transaction behavior under new fundamental information are apparent: when the market receives positive (negative) public information regarding a company, less overconfident investors will buy (sell) company stock from (to) the more overconfident investors, until a new valuation equilibrium is reached. Consequently, if we observe systematic deviations between different types of investors with respect to their reaction to new public information, we may suspect differences in overconfidence between the different types of investors.
In the context of this investor overconfidence framework, our findings would indicate that large investors are less overconfident (or even fully rational) than households and countries and international organizations. If rationality can be seen as a measure of sophistication, we can conclude that large investors are more sophisticated investors than their counterparts. This conclusion seems intuitive, as large investors certainly can be expected to be the most professional ones 8 . The findings are well in line with the overconfidence literature, as presented by for instance Odean (1998b) . Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) find that household investors pursue "contrarian" strategies with respect to past returns. We can now shed some light over the following hypothesis that they put forward:
"Our result could be part of a larger phenomenon in which unsophisticated investors, as a rule, are overly eager to cash out on winning stocks or to buy losing stocks or both, whereas sophisticated investors are patient enough to do the opposite. If it is true that unsophisticated investors react to past returns in this fashion, then they should similarly exhibit contrarian overreaction to other types of information, such as earnings announcements."
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000): page 66
It thus seems possible that Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) are correct in that their findings are part of a larger phenomenon in the stock market. Our evidence suggests that this larger phenomenon possibly is investor overconfidence, a well-established psychological phenomenon.
Asymmetric information?
We find that the majority of investors are biased towards increasing their holdings during the week after the disclosure of new financial statement information, independent of the earnings information. Large investors on the other hand show opposite behavior, displaying a bias towards decreasing their holdings in the same situation. This is an observation that may be explained by asymmetric information between different types of investors. It seems possible that large investors can access more detailed analysis, or even inside information, on companies and hence can better anticipate future financial statement information. These better informed investors would thus be less averse towards increasing their holdings before the disclosure of new financial statement information than less informed investors, as their uncertainty regarding the future information is decreased by detailed analysis. Consequently, more informed investors would capitalize their investments, and on average decrease their holdings, when the new information becomes public and less informed investors become more active. The less informed investors, in this case the majority investors in the market, would hence act as counterparts to the more informed investors by on average increasing their holdings. This finding could indicate that the finding of Lee (1992) , that small buy transactions increase after the disclosure of new financial statement information, is a function of asymmetric information in the stock market.
Domestic versus foreign investors
After the disclosure of new financial statement information foreign investors show behavior that is very similar to that of the majority of investors in the stock market. This observation would imply that foreign investors on average are as sophisticated or unsophisticated as domestic investors, and hence that it is investor size that correlates with investor sophistication. Indeed, this conclusion seems as a very intuitive one in the global financial market where large investors around the world have access to highly similar tools and analysis. However, large investors have a bias for decreasing their holdings after the disclosure of new financial statement information. Our findings hence suggest that large investors act as antagonists to the majority of investors with respect to new financial statement information. We further find evidence indicating that foreign investors show behavior similar to that of the majority of domestic investors.
We offer investor overconfidence as a possible explanation for the documented differences in behavior with respect to new financial statement information. Further, we suggest that information asymmetries exist between different types of investors prior to the disclosure of new earnings information. More specifically, large investors appear to be less overconfident and better informed than the majority, but not all, other investors.
Furthermore, foreign investors seem to be rather equal to domestic investors in their behavior under new earnings information. In conclusion, the findings of this study add to the mounting evidence suggesting investor heterogeneity. 
